Le prochain séminaire d’économie
Nous recevons Julien Vauday (CEPN) sur le thème Politique privée et prêts multilatéraux. Vous trouverez le résume ci-dessous.
Firms’ interests are nowadays disseminated worldwide. When a country is facing an economic crisis, many foreign firms’ interests may be threatened. This paper provides a theoretical modeling of private sector lobbies’ influence on governments in view of ultimately shaping international organizations’ decisions. While our model is designed primarily to reflect interactions on International Financial Institutions’ loan decisions, it can easily be extended to any type of international organization in which governments seat and interconnections between international and domestic economic, political and diplomatic interests are at play. Our main finding is that lobbying may raise the probability of consensus in international organizations for two reasons. First, lobbies’ position regarding multilateral support may be closer of the mean position of the international community than the one of the government they influence. Second, a lobby can increase the range over which its government gains if a financial support is granted. While the first effect can go the other way around, this is not the case of the second one. The model also shows that strong government’s diplomatic proximity with the country facing the crisis may reduce the effect of lobbying, whereas the share of the population the lobby represents increases the positiveeffect of lobbying on the probability of reaching a consensus.
Séances à venir:
- Kako Nubukpo, Burno Tinel et Martial Ze Belinga – “Sortir l’Afrique de la servitude monétaire” – 07 mars
- Benjamin Lemoine (Univ.Paris Dauphine – IRISSO) – “L’ordre de la dette” – 14 mars
L’équipe du séminaire